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1Residential Appliance Efficiency Standards Versus Appliance Efficiency
Taxes - Introduction and Overview
Since 1975, national efforts to improve the efficiency of resi-
dential energy-using appliances have gained momentum. Legislation
establishing procedures for appliance efficiency improvement has
been passed in several stages. In 1975, the Energy Policy and Conser-
vation Act (amended by the Energy Conservation Policy Act of 1976)
identified thirteen categories of appliances for the National Bureau
of Standards (NBS) to test.1 The NBS was directed to develop test
procedures which would determine annual operating costs and at least
one other measure of energy consumption for each appliance. In
addition, the NBS was instructed to develop an "energy efficiency
improvement target" for each appliance. For 10 appliance categories,
the target was designed to raise aggregate energy efficiency at least
20% above 1972 levels. For the remaining three (TVs, clothes washers
and dehumidifiers/humidifiers), the target was set at the maximum
feasible improvement level as determined by NBS and the Federal Energy
Administration (FEA). Labeling procedures were designed for the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to implement.
The National Energy Conservation Policy Act (NECPA) of 1978
changed these targets to prescribed standards and specified that
standards for nine of the thirteen appliances be published in the
1Refrigerators and refrigerator-freezers, freezers, clothes dryers,
water heaters, room air-conditioners, home heating equipment (exclud-
ing furnaces), kitchen ranges and ovens, central air conditioners,
furnaces, dishwashers, televisions, clothes washers and humidifiers/
dehumidifiers.
2Federal Register by December 1980, and the remaining four (dishwashers,
TVs, clothes washers and humidifiers/dehumidifiers) be published by
November 1981. The standards are to be designed to achieve the
"maximum improvement in energy efficiency" deemed technologically
feasible and economically justifiable by the Secretary of the Depart-
ment of Energy (DOE). This determination is to be based on seven
factors including economic impact, cost-benefit ratios, amount of
energy saved, impact on competition and the effect on product per-
formance. According to the discretion of DOE, standards may vary
across appliances and are to be phased in over a five-year period
through the promulgation of interim standards. DOE's present plans
(Federal Register, January 2, 1979) are to publish 2 sets of inter-
mediate standards to become effective June 1981 and December 1983.
Final standards are to become effective in December 1985.
In the legislative hurry for the implementation of efficiency
standards, three important questions have received little attention.
They are
* Should energy efficiency standards or energy
efficiency taxes be used to attain the "energy
efficiency improvement targets"?
* Just what are the economic impacts of appliance
efficiency standards, and are the engineering
and economic analysis underlying the impact
estimates correct?
* What will the effects of proposed appliance
efficiency standards be on other DOE policy
areas, in particular, on the efforts to
commercialize solar photovoltaics?
Let us discuss each question in some greater detail. The first
3question regarding relative desirability of taxes versus standards
has long concerned economic theorists and policy pragmatists (for
example, within the Environmental Protection Agency). The theoretical
literature addressing the relative appropriateness of efficiency taxes
and standards is instructive. In a world of full information and no
market failures, the price system will determine the optimal level
or distribution of appliance efficiency [12]. However, in a world
characterized by asymmetric market information, Leland [9] demonstrates
that minimum quality or efficiency standards are welfare increasing.
Weitzman [14] examines the use of either standards (quality controls)
or taxes/subsidies (price controls) to attain a socially desired
production of a given good, say appliance efficiency.
While these latter two analyses justify the use of standards
and/or taxes in certain cases, they leave empirical ambiguities.
For example, Weitzman [14] derives a measure for the comparative
advantage of using price controls rather than quantity controls.
His measure depends upon the curvature of the benefit and cost func-
tions (B" and C" - - using his notation) for the provision of the
particular good and the variance or uncertainty in the cost function
[14, p.485]. In the case of using standards or taxes for appliance
efficiency, the costs of providing efficiency seem fairly certain;
they depend upon fairly well understood engineering calculations.
The benefits to consumers seem subject to greater uncertainty [1];
however, Weitzman's analysis suggests such uncertainty has no effect
upon the relative desirability of prices over quantities.
4While it is difficult to realistically estimate the social benefit
and cost functions for appliance efficiency, it is possible to broadly
discuss their curvature in an attempt to give empirical content to
Weitzman's measure. If we let q* be the socially optimal efficiency
for a given appliance, then Weitzman demonstrates that if the benefit
function is kinked around q* and the cost function rises fairly con-
stantly and monotonically, then B" will be large and C" will be
relatively small. In this case, efficiency standards (quantity
restrictions) will have a relative advantage. If, however, benefits
are fairly flat (B" is small) and the costs are rising quickly around
q*, efficiency taxes (price restrictions) will have a relative ad-
vantage. The former case is exhibited in Figure la: if the benefits
(B) of efficiency (q) rise quickly and level off asymptotically,
the benefits curve is kinked at q* and efficiency standards will be
the better instrument to ensure the optimal level. Dewees [1] seems
to suggest that benefits do rise rapidly with respect to efficiency
and then level off. If costs in the relevant range rise more stead-
ily, then Figure la obtains and efficiency standards would be desirable.
Figure lb exhibits the shapes of the benefit and cost functions
when costs are kinked and benefits rise smoothly. This case would
obtain if the costs of increased efficiency rise slowly for certain
levels and then rise abruptly as efficiency becomes more difficult
to produce - i.e., near the technologically maximum levels of effi-
ciency. In this case, efficiency taxes would be optimal.
A more realistic case seems to be that found in Figure lc.
5The benefits curve rises quickly to qb but then levels off fairly rapidly
while the cost curve rises fairly steadily to qc, the approximate level
of technically achievable efficiency. Beyond qC, costs rise very
steeply. In this example, the optimum level will be either q or
qC. If q < qb, then q is the optimum and efficiency taxes are optimal.
If qb < q, then the relative desirability of standards versus taxes
depends upon whether qb or q is optimal the level q*. That will
depend not only upon local curvature, but also upon the entire schedule
of B and C. As drawn in c, q = q* and efficiency standards are
optimal.
The second question is more empirical in nature; it concerns the
estimated impacts of the appliance efficiency standards. The standards
are to be set at the maximum level deemed technologically feasible as
long as they are economically justifiable. Some studies have assessed
the effects and the cost/benefit characteristics of proposed standards
[7]. However, I know of no study that has incorporated DOE estimates
of maximum feasible efficiency improvements in order to assess the
economic effects and compare them to effects generated by other plaus-
ible scenarios. Likewise, I know of no study that has examined the
realism of DOE estimates of maximum appliance efficiency gains.
The third question emphasizes the need for DOE to understand the
interrelationships between their dispersed energy policies. Appliance
efficiency standards will have impacts upon residential demand for
appliances using natural gas, oil and electricity; furthermore, such
standards will affect appliance utilization. Such effects will
directly impact electricity demand within a given household and
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7consequentially, indirectly impact the potential for solar photovoltaic
devices. Since DOE has committed itself to rapid commercialization
of residential solar photovoltaics, it should be aware of the effects
upon commercialization of its appliance efficiency standards.
This paper does not pretend to answer all of these questions.
The first question requires greater theoretical effort. This paper
attempts to help answer the second and third questions and to provide
a modest empirical word of caution before we rush headlong to effi-
ciency standards. To that end, it first introduces and examines the
behavioral characteristics of residential energy demand and residential
demand models to indicate how proposed efficiency standards and taxes
will affect energy demand. Using an existing demand model (the Oak
Ridge National Laboratory Model - ORNL), Section 2 estimates the
effects of potential appliance efficiency standards (maximum tech-
nologically feasible) and compares them to several other policy
scenarios including a series of appliance efficiency taxes. The
effects estimated and compared are levels of appliance efficiency
and energy demand; a full cost-benefit comparison of the increased
capital costs and decreased operating costs for each scenario is not
performed. Furthermore, the ORNL model is used to examine whether the
DOE assessments of maximum technological feasibility are reasonable
and to estimate the level of appliance efficiency taxes required to
achieve those proposed levels. Section 3 speculates on the effects
of the efficiency standards on solar photovoltaics commercialization.
Finally, Section 4 summarizes the relevant conclusions.
81) Residential Energy Demand and Models of It
In order to analyze and predict the effects of appliance efficiency
standards in the residential sector, it is necessary to understand
the nature and determinants of residential energy demand, to under-
stand how standards will alter that demand behavior, and to incor-
porate that understanding into models for policy prediction.
Residential energy demand is derived from the demand for the
services provided by an energy source in conjunction with the appliances
used with that energy source. Any analysis of energy demand must,
therefore, deal with the fact that fuels and fuel using appliances
are combined in varying ways to produce a particular residential
service. This appliance demand behavior is composed of three deci-
sions:
1) The decision to buy an energy-using appliance, capable
of providing a particular comfort service (e.g., cook-
ing, heating, lighting, air conditioning, etc.)
2) The decision concerning the technical characteristics
of the appliance, the fuel to be used by the appliance
and whether the appliance embodies a new technology.
3) Given the purchase of an appliance, the decision about
the frequency and intensity of use.
These decisions span the short run (when the appliance stock is fixed)
and the long run (when the size and characteristics of the appliance
stock are variable).
A model of these three decisions will predict appliance purchase
and use and can assess new technology potential when the new tech-
nologies are embodied into end-use appliances, such as heat pumps,
solar thermal water heaters and solar thermal space heaters. For
9some new technologies, such as solar photovoltaics, a fourth decision
(long-run) must be modeled:
4) The decision concerning how to provide a particular
energy source. For electricity, the decision con-
cerns the extent to which solar photovoltaics (PV)
should be used to supply electricity.
The second decision focuses upon appliance purchase; conditional
on the initial cost of an appliance, the cost of operating it, and
the discount rate of the household, residential consumers will decide
how efficient the appliance should be [3]. This decision can be left
to the household, or the government can impose efficiency standards
on the types of appliances purchased.
The third decision focuses on appliance use; utilization can be
left to market conditions or the government can impose utilization
decisions such as thermostat controls.
The fourth decision is determined by the household trade-off
between the increased capital costs of PV installations and the
consequential decreased operating costs. This decision depends upon
the level of electricity use, the cost of grid electricity, and the dis-
count rate of the household.
Different types of residential energy demand models have been
utilized to capture the first three decisions. The last decision has
only been incorporated recently [5]. The history of these models
has evidenced an evolution from aggregate, static, equilibrium spec-
ifications to dynamic, multi-equation specifications disaggregated
by the end-use of appliance, such as space heating, water heating,
dishwashing, etc. (see [4]). The aggregate static models have
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generally related energy demand to trends in energy prices and to
changes in income levels. While these aggregate, static models proved
to be historically useful tools for energy demand analysis, they have
become less useful for several reasons. The most important reasons are
that these models ignore the specific technological characteristics
(including efficiency) of the fuel-burning appliance stock and that
they do not explicitly treat the differences between long-run and
short-run energy demand indicated in the three residential demand
decisions. The aggregate models fail to analyze the relationship of
energy demand to the demand for the appliance stock required to burn
that energy. They cannot be used to explicitly assess the potential
penetration of new energy technologies, the consumer response to
mandated conservation and appliance efficiency regulations, changes
in patterns of appliance utilization, and/or changes in patterns of
appliance purchase and retirement.
To remedy these observed deficiencies, dynamic partial-adjustment
models were developed. These models make more explicit the inter-
active nature of the demand for energy and its requisite energy-burn-
ing capital. As energy demand (Decision 3) responds to changing
economic conditions, the fixed capital stock cannot adjust as rapidly
(Decisions 1 and 2) due to time lags for adding new appliances or
for retiring undesired appliances. Disequilibrium in the form of
increased or decreased appliance utilization results and energy demand
can only partially adjust to desired levels in the short run until
the capital stock adjusts. In this case, short-run price and income
11
demand responses are less than long-run responses when the appliance
stock fully adjusts to changed conditions.
While partial adjustment models admit to the differences between
short-run and long-run demand, they do not treat, formally, Decisions
1-3; nor do they treat the characteristics of the appliance stock
(e.g., efficiency), the presence of new technologies and the poten-
tial for standards affecting appliance efficiency or use.
To overcome these remaining deficiencies, multi-equation, dynamic
end-use models have been developed which characterize the frontier
of energy demand models (see [4]). These models explicitly recognize
the different behavioral characteristics of short-and long-run energy
demand and they incorporate, to varying degrees, the technological
characteristics of the energy-burning appliance stock. To accomplish
this, the models use separate equations for the short run and long run.
In the short run, the energy-using appliance stock is fixed in size
and technological characteristics (e.g., efficiency); therefore,
the short-run equations analyze demand as the utilization of the fixed
appliance stock. In the long run, the size and technological char-
acteristics of the appliance stock can change as a result of behavioral
decisions and/or mandated appliance standards; the long-run equations
of the multi-equation end-use models treat this explicitly.
Using the notation of the multi-equation end-use models for
decisions 1-3 (see [4]); we have
qt= qt* Ut(Pt Yt, wt set)Kt (la)
Kt = Kt 1 (1-6) + AKt-l (lb)
Kt-1l = F(Pt-1 cct-_l Yt-l' t-l' set-l). (lC)
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In words, equation (la) indicates actual short-run fuel demand (qt)
is equal to desired short-run fuel demand (qt*), which are both expressed
as the utilization (Ut) of a given appliance stock (Kt). The appliance
stock is considered fixed in size and characteristics during the period
t. The rate of utilization of the fuel-specific (e.g., gas, oil, or
electricity) capital stock (Kt) is a function of energy prices, house-
hold income, weather/climate and other socioeconomic factors (Pt Yt',
wt, set). Equations (lb) and (lc) treat long-run issues. Kt in any
period is given by Kt_ 1 minus retired appliances 6Kt_ 1 (6 is the
retirement rate) plus additions during t-l (AKt_ 1) to the stock of
appliances that utilize the particular fuel being analyzed. The size
of AKt 1 measures consumers' choices or preferences for a particular
fuel and its requisite appliance; if consumers find a given fuel
desirable, based on the cost and characteristics of its appliances,
AKt 1 will be large. AKt_1 is shown in equation (1c) to be determined
functionally by the relative operating costs of all possible fuels
(Ptl), the comparative characteristics of the appliances required
for the alternative fuels (cct 1 ) and Yt-l, t-l' and set-1 . cct-1
includes the capital costs and efficiencies of the appliances of
the alternative fuels.
Equations (la) - (lc) permit explicit analysis of efficiency
standards. Appliance use standards will affect utilization Ut, in
equation (la); policy simulations can fix Ut directly or estimate
consumers' response to standards (e.g., thermostat controls for the
space heating end use). In equation (lc), appliance efficiency
standards and taxes/subsidies will affect the cost and characteristics
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(cct_1) of appliances available for purchase. Households will face an
array of more efficient appliances and will determine the extent of
appliance purchase (Kt_ 1 in (lc)) based upon costs of appliance,
cost of operation, other characteristics of the appliance and their
discount rate. If the government decides to mandate all appliances
to be a particular efficiency, consumers will have no choice with
respect to that characteristic; appliance purchases (AKt_1) will
all be at a prescribed efficiency level.
Both efficiency taxes and standards will generate differential
impacts on the demand for appliances and fuels. As a result, they
will affect decision 4, which is given functional specification in
equation (d). In (d), the decision concerning the extent to which
photovoltaics will be used by a household (SPV - share of electricity
provided by photovoltaics) depends upon the level of electricity
SPVt S (q Pe dt, Yt wt set) (d)
St qt' Pt' ' '
demanded (qt), the price of grid electricity (pe), the discount rate
of the household dt, and yt, wt' set'
To adequately assess the full effects of efficiency standards,
it is important to have a model that fully disaggregates household
energy decisions ((la) - (d)) and that appropriately captures both
household behavior and the technological characteristics of the avail-
able appliances. Two efforts currently exist at the level of behav-
ioral disaggregation in (la) - (lc) - the model developed at the
Oak Ridge National Laboratories [8] and the model currently being
14
developed at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Energy Lab-
oratory [2]. Only the M.I.T. effort is explicitly modeling decision
(4). The models are reviewed in greater detail elsewhere [4].
While it would be desirable to use a model that treats all four
decisions (equations la) - ld)) for analyzing the full effects of
appliance efficiency standards, the M.I.T. effort is still in the
development stage. On the other hand, the Oak Ridge Model (ORNL)
is a mature policy model; as a result, I use the ORNL model to
tentatively measure the effects of efficiency standards in spite
of the fact that decision 4 is not included in that model. Section
3 will attempt to speculate on the extent of effects generated in
equation 3d).
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2) Assessment of Proposed Appliance Efficiency Standards
This Section uses the Oak Ridge Model to simulate the effects
of potential Department of Energy (DOE) appliance efficiency standards.
In light of the mandate given the Secretary, I examine the effects
of the "maximum improvement" currently deemed technologically feas-
ible. While simulating these effects, this section compares them
to appliance efficiencies chosen by the residential sector under
several alternative scenarios: a baseline scenario which assumes fuel
price increases predicted by DOE and the Brookhaven National Laboratory
(BNL) for 1976-2000 [7]; a fuel tax scenario, which differs from the
baseline by the imposition of a 100% fuel tax on electricity, gas,
and oil; and a "rational household choice" scenario which differs
from the baseline in that households are assumed to use the true
cost of capital when deciding on appliance efficiencies. The energy
demand implied by each of these scenarios is estimated. Finally,
the appliance efficiency tax required to achieve DOE standards is
estimated. For a full discussion of the price assumptions underlying
the baseline scenario, the reader should consult [7].
Table 1 presents energy efficiency levels for new appliances
considered by DOE to be the maximum technologically feasible efficiency
levels as of 1978. Table II presents the weighted (by shipments)
average efficiency of all appliances purchased in 1975 for selected
end-uses.
The estimates of Table II must be interpreted with some care,
For several end-uses, such as room air conditioners, water heaters,
16
refrigerators and freezers, the efficiency of various models differ
considerably and the mean is a rough central tendency of appliance
efficiency. For other end-uses, such as furnace and boiler space
heating, actual efficiencies are all fairly close to the mean.
Using 1975 shipment levels1, the efficiencies in Table 1 are aggre-
gated to the end-use categories in Table II. It is these estimates
of maximum technologically feasible efficiency levels that I shall
examine as potential standards.
Before assessing the impacts of these standards on residential
energy demand, it is useful to comment upon the patterns found in
Table II. The potential for efficiency increases seem to be much
smaller for space conditioning appliances than for ranges, water
heaters, clothes dryers, refrigerators and freezers. The potential
space heating efficiency increases are on the order2 of 2%; furthermore,
the single large increase for oil furnaces may be due to the use of
two different efficiency measures. There is room for large efficiency
increases in gas ranges and water heaters, due to changes in the pilot
light system. The large increases in efficiency in refrigerators,
freezers and ranges are possible as consumers move to better insulated
1Over time, the relative appliance shipments will presumably change
toward more efficient appliances (within an end use) thereby rendering
the estimated average standards in Table II conservative. I do not
attempt to approximate such compositional shifts here; the percentage
efficiency increase in Table II measures the increase in mean efficiency
with compositional effects assumed constant.
2While the potential efficiency increases in the actual space condition-
ing appliances appears small, it should be clear that we are not analyz-
ing changes in the residential housing shell, such as storm windows and
doors and insulation. Such increases in the thermal integrity of the
structure will contribute more significantly to efficiency gains.
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Table I - Likely Classes and Tentative Determinations
of Maximum Technologically Feasible Energy Efficiency Levels
Covered product type Class Preliminary maximum
technologically
feasible energy ef-
ficiency level**
Refrigerators and refrigerator ......Electric, manually de-...........10.4 ft3/kWh-day (EF)
freezers frosted 15' freezer
Electric manually de-............lO. 10 1 ft3/kWh-day (EF)
frosted 5' freezer
Electric automatic de .6.6 ft3 kWh-day (EF)
Freezers .................. Manual defrost, chest. . 16.9 ft /kWh-day (EF)
Manual defrost, upright ..........13.9 f3/kWh-day (EF)
Automatic defrost ................ 9.1 ftc/kWh-day (EF)
Clothes dryers ................ Electric, standard ...............2.77 lb/dWh (EF)
Electric, compact ................2.61 lb/dWh (EF)
Gas ..............................2.46 lb/dWh (EF)
Water heaters ................Electric .. 0.89 (EF)***
Gas ............................. 0.59 (EF)***
Oil ..............................0.50 (EF)***
Room air conditioners Window and through the wall ......11.6 Btu/watt-hour (EER)
(with outdoor side louvers)
Through the wall (no outdoor ......7.5 Btu/watt-hour (EER)
side louvers)
Packaged terminal .................8.7 Btu/watt-hour (EER)
Reverse cycle .................... 8.8 Btu/watt-hour (EER)
Home heating equipment, not .........Electric, primary and sup-........100% efficiency
including furnaces
Gas, gravity, vented room heater..58% (AFUE)***
Gas, forced air, vented room ......74% (AFUE)***
heater
Gas, gravity, vented wall .........60% (AFUE)***
furnace
Gas forced air, vented wall 70% (AFUE)***
furnace
Gas, gravity, vented floor ........70% (AFUE)***
furnace
Oil, gravity, vented room .........(AFUE)*
heater
Oil, forced air, vented floor ..... (AFUE)*
furnace
Oil, gravity, vented wall furnace.(AFUE)*
Oil, forced air, vented floor ..... (AFUE)*
furnace
Oil, forced air, vented floor .... (AFUE)*
furnace
Kitchen ranges and ovens . ...........Microwave oven ....................44% (EF)**
Electric cooking top ..............79% (EF)
Electric oven ..................... 16% (EF)***
Electric oven, self-cleaning ......14% (EF)***
Gas cooking top ................... 46% (EF)
Gas oven ........ 8.5% (EF)
Gas oven, self cleaning ...........7,8% (EF)
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Table I (cont'd.)
Covered product type Class Preliminary maximum
technologically
feasible energy ef-
ficiency level**
Central air conditioners ............ Split system .....................10.3 (SEER)***
Single package.. 8.9 (SEER)***
Furnaces ...........................Gas, gravity .....................70% (AFUE)
Gas, forced air ..................75% (AFUE)
Gas, boilers .....................79% (AFUE)
Oil, boilers ............,........85% (AFUE)
Oil, forced air ..................82% (AFUE)***
Electric .........................100% (AFUE)
*Information is not available to determine the maximum technologically feasible
energy efficiency level.
**Based on data obtained by using DOE test procedures
***Based on best available information
EP-energy factor
EER-energy efficiency ratio
AFUE-annual fuel utilization efficiency.
SEER-seasonal energy efficiency ratio.
NOTES
Source: 10 CFR Part 430, pp. 49-60; 1978 efficiency definitions are developed
more completely in Saltzman [13].
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Table II 1975 Appliance Efficiencies, Proposed Standards
and Implied Efficiency Increases
Efficiency
Measure a)
Room Air Conditioners(EER)
Boilers
Oil
Gas
Electricity
Furnaces
Oil
Gas
Electricity
Ranges
(AFUE)
1975e
8.79
75.8
80
98
Standard
8.997
75.8d
800
100
Mean Efficiency Im-
provement IDplied
by StandardY
2.36
0.0
0.0
2.04
11.33
0.0
2.04(AFUE)
(Energy into
Food; EF)
Gas
Electricity
Water Heaters
Gas
Oil
Electricity
Clothes Dryers
(Water Heat Con-
tent/Energy Used-
EF)
(Pounds of Clothes
Dried/awh)
Gas
Electricity
Refrigerators/Freezers (ft3/kwh/mo.)
Electricity
44
46
80
2.15
0.12
Freezers
Electricity
(ft3/kwh/mo.)
0.15 .4433 195.53
NOTES
a) See Table I
b) Due to data availability, based on steady state efficiency (SSE)
c) Based on AFUE
d) Standards not articulated by DOE in Table 1; 1975 mean efficiencies
held constant
e) For 1975 efficiency and sales weights, see Saltzman [13].
f) Efficiency estimates for actual 1975 sales unavailable; gas improvement
estimate used
g) (efficiency standard - 1975 efficiency)/1975 efficiency
10
39
27.08
49.88
170.80
27.90
59
50
89
2.46
.301
34.09
8.70
11.25
14.42
14.42
150.83
3 5
755
100c
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appliances with fewer luxury options.
Let us now turn to the impacts of these standards on residential
energy demand and compare those impacts to impacts generated by the
three alternative scenarios. To that end, Table III tabulates the
estimated mean efficiencies of newly purchased appliances for the
four scenarios (baseline, 100% fuel tax, "rational household choice",
and proposed DOE efficiency standards) in IIIa) - IIId) respectively
for selected years over 1975-2000. 1981 and 1983 are included because
the DOE standards are assumed1 to be imposed through interim standards
in three equal steps over the 1980-1985 period (in 1981, 1983, and
1985). The efficiencies are estimated by the ORNL model as "energy
used" to perform a given task relative to 1970, which is set at 1.00.
For example, for electrical space heating units in 2000, "average
energy used" is .754 or a 25% efficiency increase over 1970 levels
(1.00).
As a basis for comparison under baseline assumptions, we find
the ORNL model predicts space heating efficiencies will be improved
from 1975 levels of .948-.980 to 2000 levels of .754 to .834, improve-
ments that range from 12% for oil to 22% for electricity. Room air
conditioners purchased are predicted to increase 19% in mean efficiency.
Gas and oil water heaters are predicted to be about 15-20% more
efficient while purchased electrical water heaters are predicted
to be only 8.6% more efficient. Refrigerators and freezers are
approximately 25% more efficient in 2000. Finally, gas ranges/stoves
are predicted to be considerably more efficient (30%) while electrical
1See pg. 1-2 above.
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Average Efficiency Estimates
For Newly Purchased Appliances
1975 1980 1981 1983 1975-2000
% increase
a) Baseline
Space Heating
Electricity
Gas
Oil
.969
.980
.948
.893
.912
.894
.876
.899
.887
.844
.876
.877
Air Conditioning
.980 .9.9 .905 .878
Water Heating
Electricity
Gas
Oil
Refrigerators
Freezers
Cooking
Electricity
Gas
Table III
1985 1990 2000
Room
.816
.856
.869
.782
.831
.855
.754
.808
.834
22.19%
17.55%
12.03%
.853 .820 .795 18.88%
.991
.981
.940
.972
.971
.995
.970
.959
.906
.870
.882
.876
.979
.856
.953
.892
.862
.862
.856
.975
.934
.940
.866
.849
.825
.817
.968
.795
.928
.845
.838
.791
.782
.961
.762
.914
.816
.821
.750
.739
.952
.717
.906
.794
.798
.727
.716
.947
.682
8.58%
19.06%
15.11%
25.21%
26.26%
4.82
29.69%
Table III (cont'd) 1975 1980 1981 1975-2000
% increase
b) Double Fuel Prices
Space Heating
Electricity
Gas
Oil
.905
.947
.928
.726
.834
.835
.709
.822
.827
Air Conditioning
Room .925 .761
Water Heating
Electricity
Gas
Oil
Refrigerators
Freezers
Cooking
Electricity
Gas
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1983 1985 1990 2000
.683
.804
.816
.665
.791
.809
.643
.775
.800
.630
.763
.791
30.39%
19.43
14.76%
.745 .721 .703 .682 .670 25.57%
.964
.946
.916
.896
.893
.978
.916
.883
.821
.800
.667
.657
.926
.722
.876
.807
.790
.645
.635
.920
.701
.864
.787
.775
.613
.602
.911
.669
.856
.773
.766
.590
.579
.905
.646
.846
.755
.754
.565
.554
.898
.617
.842
.744
.743
.554
.544
.984
.599
12.66%
21.35%
18.89%
38.17%
39.08%
8.59%
34.61%
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Table III (cont'd)
c) Rational Household
1975 1980 1981 1983 1985 1990 2000 1975-2000
% increase
Choice
Space Heating
Electricity
Gas
Oil
Air Conditioning
Room
Water Heating
Electricity
Gas
Oil
Refri gerators
Freezers
Cooking
Electricity
Gas
.918
.943
.904
.939
.762
.840
.826
.803
.738
.828
.820
.782
.701
.809
.810
.748
.674
.796
.804
.723
.644
.780
.797
.694
.627
.769
.789
.679
31.70%
18.45%
12.72%
27.69%
.970
.952
.898
.907
.898
.992
.916
.903
.847
.805
.704
.680
.969
.747
.893
.834
.797
.675
.651
.965
.726
.877
.811
.784
.628
.603
.957
.692
.865
.795
.776
.595
.570
.950
.668
.851
.775
.765
.559
.535
.941
.639
.845
.765
.754
.544
.521
.937
.621
12.89%
19.64%
16.04%
40.02%
41.98%
5.54%
32.21%
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Table III (cont'd) 1975
d) Maximum Technologically
1980 1981 1983 1985 1990 1975-2000
% increase
Achievable Efficiency Standards
Space Heating
Electricity
Gas
Oil
Air Conditioning
Room
Water Heating
Electricity
Gas
Oil
Refrigerators
Freezers
Cooking
Electricity
Gas
2000
.969
.980
.948
.980
.950
.980
.897
.958
.950
.980
.897
.958
.950
.980
.897
.958
.950
.980
.897
.958
.950
.980
.897
.958
.950
.980
.897
.958
1.96%
0%
5.38%
2.25%
.991
.981
.940
.972
.971
.995
.970
.959
.906
.870
.882
.876
.979
.856
.936
.848
.865
.717
.694
.912
.690
.913
.790
.865
.553
.511
.845
.524
.891
.732
.865
.388
.329
.778
.358
.891
.732
.865
.388
.329
.778
.358
.891
.732
.865
.388
.329
.778
.358
10.09%
25.38%
7.98%
60.08%
66.12
21.81%
63.09%
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ranges/stoves will be only 4.8% more efficient.
In Table IIIb) the efficiency effects of a 100% fuel tax across
the 1975-2000 period are indicated. The discussion in Section 1
indicated that such increased operating costs will cause households
to utilize their equipment less and to substitute toward more efficient
appliances. These expectations are corroborated. Mean space heating
efficiencies are predicted to increase 15, 19 and 30% for oil, gas
and electricity devices respectively. Room air conditioner efficiency
is predicted to increase 20%. Water heating efficiency increases
range from 13-21% and refrigerators and freezers are forecasted to
be approximately 38% more efficient at the mean. Electrical stoves/
ranges will be 9% more efficient while such gas appliances will be
35% more efficient.
Table IIIc) presents estimates of appliance efficiencies when
consumers make rational choices, responding to the true cost of capital
rather than discount rates well above the true cost of capital.
Hausman [6] and other authors have discussed (and empirically cor-
roborated) the fact that consumers demonstrate effective discount
rates well above actual costs of capital; the effect of such discount
rates is to bias consumer choice to less efficient, energy intensive
appliances. Because such high discount rates have characterized
past residential consumer choice, they are incorporated into the
baseline results. However, the Oak Ridge model structure can be
easily alteredl to approximately incorporate the true cost of capital
See [8], pp. 39-44. In the notation of [8] values of n=10 and n=15
were incorporated to make the actual choice approximately equal to the
optimal choice. Values of n>15 generated nonsensical results.
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into household efficiency decisions. When that is done, the results
in Table IIIc) obtain. As expected, the efficiency increases suggested
by such rational consumer behavior are all above baseline increases,
the increases for electric space heating (32%), room air conditioning
(28%), electric water heaters (13%), and refrigerators/freezers
(40-42%) are substantially above baseline. Furthermore, the effi-
ciency results are greater than those suggested by a 100% fuel tax
in 5 categories and fairly close in the remaining 6 categories.
Thus, any educational or informational program would be quite effec-
tive if the program could effectively eliminate the difference between
consumer discount rates and the true cost of capital when the difference
is due to consumer ignorance.
Using these three scenarios as background, let us finally turn
to the appliance efficiency standards suggested in Table II. Table
IIId) presents the efficiency results that obtain from imposing the
DOE maximum technologically achievable efficiency standards in equal
steps in 1981, 1983, and 1985. The results are striking in several
cases. In particular, projected space heating efficiencies rise
2% for electricity, 0% for gas, and 5% for oil - all well below
baseline results. The higher efficiencies predicted under these three
other scenarios do not seem to explicable through changes in the
composition of appliances purchased; the range of possible effici-
encies is too narrow. The mean efficiency of room air conditioners
is projected to rise only 2% under DOE standards, about 1/10 the in-
crease estimated under the baseline scenario and about 1/15 of the
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increase estimated in the fuel tax and the "rational consumer choice"
scenarios. Increases larger than 2% are probable due to the com-
positional changes in the air conditioners purchased; that is, the
distribution of efficiencies will most probably be skewed toward
greater efficiency over the 1975-2000. However, it is unclear that
compositional effects will raise mean efficiency increases to the
20-30% levels. These large disparities between the standards and the
simulation results for space conditioning appliances suggest that the
DOE engineering estimates of maximum technologically achievable
efficiency standards are extremely conservativeand in need of review.
The efficiency results for the remaining end-uses are more
plausible. The imposition of maximum technologically achievable
standards raise water heater efficiencies 10, 25, and 8% for electric,
gas, and oil water heaters. These results suggest that there is
room for greater efficiency increases for gas water heaters than is
generated by the other three scenarios. For electric water heaters,
increases in mean efficiency are somewhat higher under the double
fuel price and rational household choice scenarios than are estimated
to be technologically achievable; however, such increases can be
explained by shifts in the distribution of purchased appliances
toward more efficient appliances. The increases estimated for oil
water heaters under baseline conditions are approximately double the
mean levels considered to be technologically obtainable. The increases
estimated for the double fuel prices and rational household choice
lon the other hand, technological trade-offs built into the Oak Ridge
model may be overly optimistic and in need of review.
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scenarios are even higher than baseline results. Such results would
require so substantial a shift in the distribution of sales by ef-
ficiency that I feel that the maximum technologically achievable
standards may be in error.l
Under all three scenarios, estimated mean efficiencies are below
maximum technologically achievable levels for refrigerators, freezers,
and electric and gas stoves. Rational consumers would choose refrig-
erators and freezers with mean efficiency levels approximately twice
those obtained under baseline conditions. However, even with discount
rates that approximate capital costs, consumers will not choose
maximally efficient refrigerators and freezers. Similarly, rational
choice generates mean efficiency levels substantially below maximum
levels for stoves/ranges. The reason seems to be that for these
particular end-uses (refrigeration/freezing, cooking) that the cost
of capital services includes not only appliance efficiency, but
also consumer luxury accessories (e.g., self-cleaning oven, automatic
defrost, etc.). As a result, given a di-scount rate for a consumer
across all end-uses, his cost of capital services will be higher
for refrigerator/freezers and stoves/ranges and his chosen technology
more fuel intensive (e.g., further from maximum technologically
achievable levels).
Table IV compiles the estimates of fuels consumed over 1975-2000
for the four scenarios. The fuel tax scenario of double fuel prices
will lower short-run appliance utilization and shift long-run appliance
1Or again, there may be some over-optimism built into the ORNL model.
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choice toward more efficient appliances. These results are reflected
in Table IV where fuel use is 8% lower for electricity, 26% lower for
natural gas and 31% for oil. Under the rational household choice
scenario, fuel prices remain at baseline levels while consumer dis-
count rates are set at the cost of capital; thus, utilization will
be unaffected but long-run appliance choice will reflect the actual
trade-off of capital cost and operating cost for each fuel in each
end use. Under this scenario, electricity use declines even further
(9%) below baseline. The biggest surprise, however, comes in esti-
mated fuel use under the maximum technologically achievable efficiency
standards. Table III indicated that the baseline, double fuel price
and rational consumer choice scenarios generated mean efficiency
levels well above technologically achievable levels for the major
residential fuel using appliances (space conditioning and water
heating). Only for refrigeration/freezing and cooking were estimated
efficiencies well below technologically achievable levels. As a
result, total fuel use under the efficiency standards scenario is
only 2% below baseline for electricity and 1% below for natural
gas. Furthermore, oil use is above baseline by 11% because the
baseline and other two scenarios estimate mean efficiency gains
that DOE apparently deems as technologically impossible.
Finally, the Oak Ridge model can be utilized to estimate the
extent of mean appliance subsidies required to achieve mean effi-
ciency levels deemed to be maximum technologically achievable.l
1 See the technology trade-off curves in [8] pp. 17-25.
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The introduction discussed the fact that either standards or taxes/
subsidies can be used to affect consumer purchases of efficient
appliances. Each tool may be more useful in certain situations.
I have estimated the effects of standards above. The extent of
efficiency subsidies required to attain those standard efficiency
levels can also be indicated. Since mean space heating and cooking
efficiencies and oil water heating efficiencies are higher under
baseline than deemed technologically possible, no amount of subsidy
will generate greater efficiencies if DOE is correct in its measure-
ment of maximum technologically feasible efficiency increases.
However, for electric and gas water heaters, refrigerators and
freezers and for stoves/ranges, levels of subsidies are indicated
in Table V that are required to attain maximum mean efficiency levels
over 1981-1985 and beyond. The subsidies are expressed as the
percentage of the mean appliance price under the baseline. The
largest subsidies are required for those end-uses that offer the
largest potential efficiency gains - refrigeration/freezing and
cooking.
Table IV Fuel Consumed (QBTU*)
Baseline
Electricity
Gas
Oil
Double Fuel Prices
Electricity
Gas
Oil
Rational Household Choice
Electricity
Gas
Oil
Maximum Technologically Achievable Efficiency Standards
Electricity
Gas
Oil
QBTU is Quadrillion BTU
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1975 1980 1985 1990
7.31
5.60
2.49
2000
9.09
5.35
2.30
10.52
5.05
2.39
12.10
5.03
2.54
15.03
5.10
2.68
6.99
5.11
2.23
8.21
4.44
1.78
9.46
4.10
1.79
10.99
3.94
1.87
13.90
3.76
1.84
7.25
5.56
2.48
8.74
5.21
2.24
9.87
4.85
2.26
11.17
4.78
2.36
13.65
4.77
2.44
7.31
5.60
2.49
9.12
5.37
2.32
10.46
5.05
2.46
11.93
5.01
2.70
14.79
5.06
2.97
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Table V Estimated Appliance Subsidies to
Technologically Achievable
1975-1980
Space Heating
Electricity
Gas
Oil
Air Conditioning
Room
Water Heating
Electricity
Gas
Oil
Refrigerators
Freezers
Cooking
Electricity
Gas
1981
2.28
3.84
2.46
2.95
6.69
3.91
1983
4.19
9.26
7.74
10.95
27.89
31.65
Achieve Maximum
Standards*
1985
6.70
23.63
23.76
23.52
108.80
54.82
1990
3.90
19.76
22.92
22.57
107.10
52.76
*expressed as percentage of mean appliance prices obtained under the baseline.
2000
2.83
16.12
22.33
22.09
106.10
50.75
-
- -
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3) The Potential Impact of Residential Appliance Efficiency
Standards on Solar Photovoltaic Commercialization
The Department of Energy has undertaken analysis to help
commercialize solar photovoltaics [11]. However, DOE may not fully
recognize the effects that its effort for improving appliance
efficiency will have on PV commercialization. Section 2 estimated
the efficiency impacts and energy demand resulting from DOE standards
and three other scenarios. Let us examine how those impacts will
affect PV desirability.
The decision to provide part of the residential electricity
load through solar photovoltaics will depend upon the factors identi-
fied in Section 1: the level of residential electricity demand
(qe), the price of grid-connected electricity (pe), the discount
rate of the household (dt), weather/climate (wt), household income
(Yt) and other socioeconomic factors (set). Using analysis developed
elsewhere [5], we can indicate the important determinants of this
decision. Figure 2a indicates that a given level of electricity
(qe i = 1...3) used by a household can be supplied by an array of
technologies (qe) which includes grid-connected electricity and
electricity supplied by alternative sources such as storage or
direct solar PV devices. If grid electricity is used entirely,
households will be choosing technologies at the bottom right of the
technology trade-off curves in Figure 2a). However, the household
can decide to supply electricity by utilizing more capital and less
grid power (through PV and storage). The technology trade-off curves
((q)) indicate the choices available to a household where 0 will
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depend upon q and weather/climate. In this choice, the household
will minimize costs by equating the marginal rate of technical
substitution to the relative factor prices (Pt and dt)l; optimal
choices 1, 2, and 3 result, involving a combination of grid electri-
city and solar PV [5].
The effects of climate, utility buy-back schemes, changing
discount rates, the divergence of household discount rates from the
cost of capital, the scale of electricity demand, and changing the
price of electricity (peak load pricing, taxes) have been analyzed
elsewhere [5]. Based on that analysis and the insights above, we
can state that the estimated impacts of the energy scenarios in
Section 2 will affect PV potential through pe, qe and d. These
variables will be altered under the four scenarios as in Table VI.
The baseline assumptions incorporate p and db . Under the 100%
fuel tax, pe = 2pb while d = db; the result is qe at levels of about
92% of qeb over 1975-2000. Under the scenario of rational consumer
choice, d = r where r is the cost of capital and r < db while pe = pb;
the result is qe at levels about 94% qb For the standards scenario,
e e e e
P= p, d = db and qe is essentially unchanged (.99 qb).
The impacts of these four scenarios are illustrated in Figures
2a) - 2b). Let Figure 2a) reflect Baseline conditions so that the
budget line slope is determined by p b/db and q - q3 reflects the
1To be precise, the cost of capital services should be used here.
A major factor in determining that cost of capital services is the
discount rate; I use it in the heuristic discussion here. For
the more formal development, see 5].
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average for household energy demand generated by dividing 7.31 - 15.03
QBTU by the number of households. In Figure 2a), some photovoltaics
will be purchased; it is probable in most regions that the current
technology trade-off curves are closer to those in Figure 2b), given
eb and db. In that case, no photovoltaics will be purchased.
Whether 2a) or 2b) is the correct approximation of current technology
and factor prices is an empirical matter; the effects of the alterna-
tive scenarios relative to Baseline will be the same whether 2a) or
2b) describes the initial set of conditions.
Figure 2c) indicates the effects of a fuel tax or rational
consumer choice. In both cases, the relative cost of grid electri-
city rises while the average scale of household demand drops 6-8%
(assuming the same number of households). If the technology trade-
off curves are non-homothetic (and capital using), the lower scale
will reduce the desirability of solar photovoltaics [5]. At the
same time, the shift in relative prices will make PV more desirable
(points lc and 2c) conditional on q. This increased desirability
will obtain whether 2a) or 2b) is the appropriate summary of Baseline
conditions.' Whether the fuel tax or the rational consumer choice
case will generate greater PV potential will depend upon the exact values
of pe/d in both cases, the shape of (q!) and the extent of non-
homotheticity in (qe) [5].
Under the DOE standards scenario, Baseline conditions obtain.
lof course, it is possible that the relative shift in pe/d will still
result in a corner solution in Figure 2b); in that case, PV potential
has increased but it is still not purchased.
3a
K
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2a) e e
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Grid Electricity
0(q ,w)
Grid Electricity
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2c) qe qe
q q 2
Figure 2:
Grid Electricity
Alternative Photovoltaic/Grid Electricity
Technology Trade-Off Curves
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pe and d are at Baseline levels while qe is essentially unchanged.
As a result, appliance efficiency standards will have nearly no
effect on PV potential compared to Baseline. Furthermore, if the
DOE maximum efficiency estimates are too conservative for space
heating and water heating, as is suggested possible in Section 2,
then qe is too high under the standards scenario. If this is indeed
e e e e
true, then pe = b d dv and qe < qb; in this case, standards will
have a negative effect on PV potential compared to the Baseline.
More importantly, the appliance efficiency standards will have a
greater negative impact upon PV potential than the fuel tax or programs
aimed at consumer information (i.e., getting d = r). We may conclude,
therefore, that if DOE can accomplish appliance efficiency gains and
energy demand levels considered desirable using fuel taxes or programs
aimed at changing household discount rates (that can include capital
subsidies), it should use those policy tools before efficiency standards
in order to increase PV commercialization potential.
39
4) Conclusions
The preceding results strongly suggest their own conclusions.
In the first place, Baseline conditions suggest appliance efficiency
choices well above standards set at the maximum technologically
feasible levels for space heating, space cooling and oil water
heating. Efficiency gains under the other two scenarios are even
larger for these end-uses. As a result, I must conclude that DOE
has underestimated efficiency potential for those end-uses, or else
the ORNL model has incorporated overly optimistic technological anal-
yses. In the second place, other policy tools such as fuel taxes
and information programs aimed at making consumer choice rational
(d = r) will generate efficiency gains well above Baseline (with
the same qualifications for space conditioning and oil water heat-
ing); however, these policy tools will have a positive effect on
solar PV commercialization potential; appliance efficiency standards
will have either no effect or a negative effect. Finally, even if
the efficiency and demand results generated by the standards are
felt desirable as opposed to the fuel tax or consumer information,
it may be appropriate to obtain those results via appliance subsidies.
The necessary appliance subsidies are estimated.
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